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Between East and West:  
Polio Vaccination across the  
Iron Curtain in Cold War Hungary
dora vargha
Summary: In 1950s Hungary, with an economy and infrastructure still devastated 
from World War II and facing further hardships, thousands of children became 
permanently disabled and many died in the severe polio epidemic that shook the 
globe. The relatively new communist regime invested significantly in solving the 
public health crisis, initially importing a vaccine from the West and later turn-
ing to the East for a new solution. Through the history of polio vaccination in 
Hungary, this article shows how Cold War politics shaped vaccine evaluation and 
implementation in the 1950s. On the one hand, the threat of polio created a safe 
place for hitherto unprecedented, open cooperation among governments and 
scientific communities on the two sides of the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, 
Cold War rhetoric influenced scientific evaluation of vaccines, choices of disease 
prevention, and ultimately the eradication of polio.
Keywords: Cold War, polio, Salk, Sabin, vaccines, Hungary, World Health Or-
ganization, children, eradication
On July 13, 1957, a fairly prestigious group, including leading state officials 
and party members of the People’s Republic of Hungary, greeted a tall, 
black-haired man at the airport: a West German pilot. The Communist 
Party official shook his hand in the name of all Hungarian mothers, while 
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experts from the Health Ministry and the National Public Health Institute 
inspected the cargo, a long-awaited shipment of the Salk vaccine.1 This 
inactivated vaccine was developed by Jonas Salk and licensed in 1955 after 
a massive field trial in the United States. The vaccine, administered as an 
injection, contained killed poliovirus strains that would provide immunity 
to paralytic poliomyelitis.
The vaccine, whose arrival was dramatically depicted in news broad-
casts,2 made its way to Hungary via a complicated route. The precious 
vaccine, developed in the United States, was manufactured and shipped 
from Canada, traveled to Amsterdam, where a West German pilot on a 
Swiss airplane picked it up, and was flown over the Iron Curtain, arriving 
in Budapest.3
Had the pilot been able to spend a few days at his destination, he would 
have seen a country recuperating from one crisis and entering another. 
Merely half a year had passed since Russian tanks were rolling along the 
streets of Budapest; the capital had played host to desperate battles as part 
of a revolution against the communist regime in the fall of 1956. The new 
Kádár government had just started showing its teeth: executions of those 
whom officials called “counterrevolutionaries” started in early spring. Still, 
the country was slowly recovering from its complete standstill, restoring 
public transportation, removing rubble, moving on.
It was into this social and political environment that the most severe 
polio epidemic in Hungarian history made an entrance in the early sum-
mer of 1957. By October, nearly 2,300 children were paralyzed by the 
disease: this was an incidence rate of twenty-three per hundred thousand, 
one of the highest rates in Europe. The stakes were thus high: the new 
postrevolutionary government was faced with a crisis of a different kind and 
needed to show power and efficiency in answering the epidemic challenge.
Meanwhile in Moscow, Leningrad, and Cincinnati, an improbable 
relationship of another kind was forming. In early 1956, a Soviet medical 
mission arrived in the United States, led by Mikhail Chumakov, renowned 
Russian virologist, his wife and colleague Marina Voroshilova, and Anatoli 
1. “Július 18. És 19–Én Megkezdődik a Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védőoltás. Az Egészségügyi 
Minisztérium Hivatalos Tájékoztatója,” Népakarat, July 14, 1957.
2. Szülők, Vigyázzatok!, film reel (Budapest: Health Ministry, 1957).
3. The vaccine in question was manufactured by Connaught Laboratories. By 1957, 
Connaught became a major Salk vaccine exporter, supplying Czechoslovakia and Britain, 
among over forty countries. Luis Barreto, Rob Van Exan, and Christopher J. Rutty, “Polio 
Vaccine Development in Canada: Contributions to Global Polio Eradication,” Biologicals 
34 (2006): 91–101.
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Smorodentsev.4 The delegation studied the production of the Salk vaccine 
and ongoing research in epidemiology. During the trip, they also visited 
the laboratory of Albert Sabin. This visit turned out to be the beginning of 
a decade-long exchange. Scientists, specimens, and vaccine vials crossed 
the Iron Curtain in both directions as cooperation intensified between 
American and Soviet virologists, especially Sabin and Chumakov’s group. 
This cooperation had the blessing of both the FBI and the State Depart-
ment, despite warnings from the Department of Defense that the mate-
rials and research involved could be used to make biological weapons.5
As a result of this cooperation, the Sabin vaccine became the second 
polio vaccine to enter Hungary, this time from the Soviet Union. This vac-
cine, in contrast to the Salk vaccine, contained live attenuated polioviruses 
that were weak enough not to cause symptoms, but still strong enough to 
elicit immunity to the disease. The Sabin vaccine was administered orally, 
mixed with sweet syrup or dropped on sugar cubes.
The story of the two vaccines, one arriving from the West, the other 
from the East, shows how, for the sake of polio prevention, holes in the 
Iron Curtain opened and closed. Furthermore, the history of polio vac-
cination in Hungary highlights how political alliances do and do not 
produce trust—in technologies, in science, in one’s own government, in 
the other side, in doctors, and in citizens. Trust that is fundamental to 
epidemic management. Polio had an ambivalent effect: it had the power 
to turn enemies into friends and create a site of détente, and at the same 
time reinforce the very Cold War antagonisms that it had worked against. 
A closer look at how the politics of polio played out in Hungary reveals 
gaping holes in the Iron Curtain through which scientists, technologies, 
and knowledge openly and legitimately traveled from both sides. This 
story points to otherwise invisible moments in the Cold War, when gov-
ernments would openly contradict their own policies with their actions 
and scientific cooperation between East and West would yield results 
subsequently used widely by both sides. However, the use of the Salk and 
Sabin vaccines in Hungary also shows the limits of flexibility in Cold War 
politics, and the way in which the alleged neutrality of science and chil-
dren’s health that created this elusive space of cooperation was thoroughly 
politicized and permeated with Cold War frustrations.
Traditionally, Cold War scholarship has focused on high politics and 
security studies. Cold War relations between East and West have been 
4. Saul Benison, “International Medical Cooperation: Dr. Albert Sabin, Live Poliovirus 
Vaccine and the Soviets,” Bull. Hist. Med. 56 (1982): 460–83, 467.
5. David M. Oshinsky, Polio: An American Story (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 
251.
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analyzed through military, political, and socioeconomic rivalries as con-
flicts between socialism and capitalism. These considerations are no doubt 
crucial parts of the story, as the following discussion demonstrates. How-
ever, new dimensions of interaction between the two sides can be traced 
when looking at the Cold War from different perspectives6—in this case, 
the experience of polio elimination in Hungary. One of the approaches 
that argue for a broadening of geographical focus and scope of historical 
investigation comes from recent studies in the fields of history of science 
and science and technology studies.7
This article shifts attention from the two superpowers to an Eastern 
European state and focuses on the circulation of medical knowledge and 
technology rather than the competition between the Soviet Union and the 
United States. In contrast to Cold War intransigence, the case of Hungar-
ian polio vaccination shows surprising flexibility in foreign and domestic 
policies and indicates circumstances under which the Iron Curtain was 
drawn to let people, vaccines, and practices through. Nevertheless, this 
history of medicine approach leaves open as many important questions 
as it answers. Critical historical work on health and medicine in Eastern 
Europe in the early Cold War era is scarce,8 and none has been published 
on Hungary. Furthermore, although polio in the 1950s was a significant 
public health issue on a global level, international cooperation in the fight 
against polio has not been investigated in depth.9 The goal of this article, 
6. See, for instance, approaches in Sari Autio-Sarasmo and Brendan Humphreys, eds., 
Winter Kept Us Warm: Cold War Interactions Reconsidered, Aleksanteri Cold War Series (Hel-
sinki: University of Helsinki, 2010); Zuoyue Wang, “Transnational Science during the Cold 
War: The Case of Chinese/American Scientists,” Isis 101, no. 2 (2010): 367–77; Nikolai 
Krementsov, The Cure: A Story of Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2002).
7. See David A. Hounshell, “Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technol-
ogy in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social Study of Science and Technology,” Soc. Stud. Sci. 
31, no. 2 (2001): 289–97; Marcos Cueto, Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 
1955–1975 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2007); Gabrielle Hecht, ed., 
Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War, Inside Technology (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2011); Hunter Heyck and David Kaiser, “Focus: New Perspectives 
on Science and the Cold War. Introduction,” Isis 101, no. 2 (2010): 362–66.
8. See Lily M. Hoffman, “Professional Autonomy Reconsidered: The Case of Czech 
Medicine under State Socialism,” Comp. Stud. Soc. Hist. 39, no. 2 (1997): 346–72. Several ahis-
torical studies can give an insight into Eastern European medicine in the 1950s and 1960s; 
see Richard E. Weinerman and Shirley B. Weinerman, Social Medicine in Eastern Europe: The 
Organization of Health Services and the Education of Medical Personnel in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
and Poland (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Zdenek Stich, Czechoslovak 
Health Services (Prague: Ministry of Health, Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 1962).
9. Benison, “International Medical Cooperation” (n. 4); chap. 14 in Oshinsky, Polio (n. 
5), 237–54.
Polio Vaccination across the Iron Curtain 323
based almost exclusively on original primary research,10 is to demonstrate 
the fluidity and multiplicity of the Cold War experience, which becomes 
visible when viewed through the lens of polio.
Polio Epidemics in Hungary
Polio epidemics hit Hungary more severely than ever before in the 1950s. 
Until World War II, poliomyelitis epidemics usually appeared every four 
years in Hungary, but, as in many places around the globe, outbreaks 
became more frequent and more deadly from 1952 and were perceived 
as a constant threat until 1959. The epidemics hit Hungary in the sum-
mers of 1952, 1954, 1956, 1957, and 1959. According to available statistics, 
cases of polio rose to 23.8 and 18.3 per hundred thousand in the peak 
years of 1957 and 1959, respectively.11 When compared to those for other 
countries, these numbers are rather high. In England/Wales and West 
Germany, the highest incidence rate was around 18 per hundred thou-
sand in 1950 and 1952, while it reached nearly 21 in the Netherlands in 
1956.12 Epidemics in the United States reached their highest number at 
37 per hundred thousand in the peak year of 1952.13
Polio was considered so important by the mid-1950s that prime min-
ister Imre Nagy personally gave orders to found the Heine-Medin Post 
Treatment Hospital in the midst of the 1956 revolution.14 Soon, hundreds 
10. Based on research conducted in Budapest, Geneva, London, Philadelphia, and 
New Haven, this article draws on the archival sources of the Health Ministry and Ministe-
rial Council of the People’s Republic of Hungary, Radio Free Europe, and the Hungarian 
National Film Archives; Hungarian, British, and American medical journals; the internal 
newspaper of the Heine-Medin Hospital in Budapest; the Dorothy M. Horstmann Papers; 
newspaper articles; reports of the Hungarian National Public Health Institute; international 
conference proceedings; and memoirs and oral history interviews.
11. István Dömök, “A hazai járványügyi helyzet az élő poliovirus vakcina bevezetése 
előtt,” in A Gyermekbénulás Elleni Küzdelem: Beszámoló Egy Ma Már Múlttá Váló Rettegett Betegség 
Ellen Folytatott Hősies Küzdelemről És Felszámolásának Lehetőségéről: A Szent László Kórház Cen-
tenáriumára Készült Összeállítás, ed. Rezső Hargitai and Ákosné Kiss (Budapest: Literatura 
Medica, 1994), 24–41.
12. Ulrike Lindner and Stuart Blume, “Vaccine Innovation and Adoption: Polio Vac-
cines in the UK, the Netherlands and West Germany, 1955–1965,” Med. Hist. 50 (2006): 
425–46, figure 1.
13. Daniel J. Wilson, Polio (Portsmouth, N.H.: Greenwood, 2009), 14.
14. Heine-Medin is a popularly used alternative name for poliomyelitis in Hungary. On 
the foundation of the hospital by Imre Nagy, see Dr. László Lukács, “Letter to the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross,” manuscript no. CWD/Ehm in Demandes d’aide pour 
secours en Hongrie B AG 280 094-031.01 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red 
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of children were hospitalized as the two most severe epidemics hit the 
country in 1957 and 1959.15 Vaccination was introduced in Hungary in 
the fall of 1957 with the Salk and (in 1959) Sabin vaccines, the former 
brought by the West, the latter arriving from the Soviet Union. After 1963, 
the number of cases fell to a few per year, and the last wild polio case was 
registered in 1969. Since 1972 (the appearance of an imported case—a 
person who contracted polio elsewhere and fell sick in Hungary), there 
have been no new recorded cases of polio in the country.16
Vaccine from the West: Salk Vaccination
The year 1957 marked a turning point in the Hungarian history of polio: 
the summer heat brought the most severe epidemic ever seen in the coun-
try. Simultaneously, a new hope for ending all future epidemics appeared 
in the form of the Salk vaccine. The growing number of polio cases all 
over Hungary from May onward resulted in increased concern among 
parents and the government.17 Later that month, Health Minister Frigyes 
Doleschall presented a pessimistic forecast at a governmental hearing: “A 
significantly higher number of cases has occurred [this year] than in the 
respective months of previous years, even if we take into account the two 
recent epidemic years (1954, 1956). The situation is all the more aggra-
vating since according to our experience, the number of cases peak after 
the months following the hottest periods. Therefore, we can expect the 
polio epidemic to cause severe problems this year.”18 As the minister’s 
Cross Archives, 1956); Budai Gyermekkórház és Rendelőintézet Kht., “A Kórház Története,” 
http://www.janoskorhaz.hu/tortenet/#a-budai-gyermekkorhaz, accessed November 13, 2007.
15. The patients entering the hospital were mainly children (in 1957 more than 90 per-
cent of the 781 new patients were under six years old). Dr. Sára Schütz, “A Magyar Hygieni-
kusok Társasága Konferenciáján,” Heine-Medin Híradó 1 (November 1959): 2.
16. István Dömök, “A kampányoltások időszaka (1959–1991),” in Hargitai and Kiss, Gyer-
mekbénulás Elleni Küzdelem (n. 11), 169.
17. Egészségügyi Minisztérium, “Az Egészségügyi Minisztérium Tájékoztatója Az Ország 
1957. Évi Május Havi Járványügyi Helyzetéről,” Népegészségügy 38, no. 6 (1957); Egészségü-
gyi Minisztérium, “Az Egészségügyi Minisztérium Tájékoztatója Az Ország 1957 Évi Június 
Havi Járványügyi Helyzetéről,” Népegészségügy 38, no. 7 (1957); Egészségügyi Minisztérium, 
“Bejelentett Heveny Fertőző Betegségek Magyarországon 1954–1959 Június Hóban,” Népe-
gészségügy 40, no. 8 (1959); “Tájékoztató a Gyermekbénulásos Megbetegedésekről,” Népsz-
abadság, June 27, 1957, 10; “Az Egészségügyi Minisztérium Tájékoztatója a Gyermekbénulásos 
Megbetegedésekről És a Védekezés Módjairól,” Népakarat, June 27, 1957, 8.
18. Frigyes Doleschall, “A Járványos Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védekezés Időszerű Fela-
datai. Előterjesztés a Magyar Forradalmi Munkás-Paraszt Kormányhoz,” manuscript no. 
3311/1957 in Minisztertanács üléseinek jegyzőkönyvei, XIX-A-83-a (Budapest: Hungarian 
National Archives, 1957), 28–29.
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prophecy seemed to come to fruition by early July, the Ministerial Council 
decided to act quickly. Having already banned public bathing and limited 
the travel of children,19 they turned to a more drastic prevention method: 
immunizing children with the new Salk vaccine.20
The only vaccine available at the time was developed by Jonas Salk in 
the United States and was licensed in 1955. In the following years, Salk’s 
vaccination spread widely throughout Europe, with Denmark leading the 
way by having immunized the entire endangered population through free 
vaccination by 1957.21 The Netherlands started nationwide mass vaccination 
in 1957, while Britain organized immunization via the Salk vaccine a year 
later.22 Among the Eastern European countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland 
began Salk vaccination with a domestically produced vaccine in 1957.23
The Hungarian Health Ministry faced hardships in securing money for 
the vaccine import,24 since the country was deep in debt and struggling 
with a chronic shortage of hard currency.25 The availability of the vaccine 
in other countries was public knowledge, since party newspapers covered 
the development and introduction of the Salk vaccine in the United States 
in 1955.26 However, in the early summer of 1957, the vaccine was still 
19. “Budapesten Nincsen Gyermekbénulási Járvány—Mondja a Tisztifőorvos. Egészsé-
gügyi Okokból Korlátozzák a Fővárosi Strandok Látogatását,” Népakarat, June 28, 1957, 1; 
Imre Ádám, “Az Ifjúság Csoportos Üdültetése,” manuscript no. 54228/1957 in Egészségügyi 
Minisztérium Állami Közegészségügyi Felügyeleti és Járványvédeli Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-
2-e (Budapest: Hungarian National Archives, 1957); “Az Ifjúság Csoportos Nyaraltatásának 
Egészségügyi Szabályai,” Népakarat, July 2, 1957, 8.
20. “A Magyar Forradalmi Munkás-Paraszt Kormány Határozata a Járványos Gyermekbé-
nulás Elleni Védekezés Időszerű Feladatairól,” 1062/1957/VII.6./Korm in Minisztertanács 
Üléseinek Jegyzőkönyvei XIX-A-83a (Budapest: Hungarian National Archives, 1957); Dole-
schall, “A Járványos Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védekezés Időszerű Feladatai” (n. 18).
21. Dr. E. Juel Henningsen, “Poliovaccination in Denmark” (paper, Sixth Symposium of 
the European Association of Poliomyelitis, Munich, September 7–9, 1959).
22. Lindner and Blume, “Vaccine Innovation and Adoption” (n. 12), 437.
23. “Poliomyelitis. Papers Presented at the Fourth International Poliomyelitis Confer-
ence” (Geneva: J.B. Lippincott, 1957).
24. Doleschall, “A Járványos Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védekezés Időszerű Feladatai” (n. 
18).
25. László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the 
Soviet Union (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004).
26. The so-called Cutter incident, when patients in California contracted polio from a 
faulty batch of vaccine produced by Cutter Laboratories, was also widely covered in news-
papers. The Hungarian press presented the incident as yet another example of the West’s 
disregard for the well-being and safety of its citizens. In May 1955, the newspaper Szabad 
Nép accused the U.S. government of rushing into the vaccination process without proper 
testing because of negligence, thus making the children guinea pigs of the free market 
economy. Sentiments softened toward the Salk vaccine (though not necessarily the United 
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unavailable for most Hungarians. As the epidemic unfolded, the Health 
Ministry addressed the question of why there was no vaccination in Hun-
gary. Doleschall released a statement explaining that hard currency was 
available for the purchase, but efforts were hindered by outside forces: 
the global demand for the vaccine was very high, and the delicate serum’s 
production could not keep up.27 Essentially this was a market economy of 
shortage that Hungarians could easily relate to.
It is almost certain, however, that the Health Ministry alone could not 
have secured the hard currency and procured the vaccine: they needed 
the Ministerial Council’s decision and approval for the intricate process 
that involved allocation of credit, adjustment of economic plans, and 
mobilization of foreign trade relations. Nor was it true that hard cur-
rency was available for vaccine procurement. In a report submitted to the 
Ministerial Council, Doleschall pointed out that “the National Planning 
Bureau in 1956 was unable to fulfill the Health Ministry’s hard currency 
need for importing Salk vaccine this year.”28 Clearly, the Health Ministry 
alone was too weak to push its agenda through. Something drastic needed 
to be done at the highest level of decision making to succeed in import-
ing the vaccine.
Following these initial obstacles, the promise of a polio-free future 
arrived on a small airplane that appeared above the skies of Budapest 
around eight o’clock the evening of July 13, 1957. The route of the first 
official vaccine shipment, outlined at the beginning of this article, is 
symbolic of international cooperation in the struggle against polio. The 
transportation of polio vaccines was an enterprise that, in its official rheto-
ric, challenged Cold War concepts and claimed to override geopolitical 
tensions in the name of science and for the benefit of children. Moreover, 
with the arrival of the vaccine, this rhetoric made an appearance in public 
discourse in Hungary. While the description of international coopera-
tion was carefully embedded in the much more familiar discourse of the 
paternal state providing for and protecting its subjects, such a carefree 
and positive tone, completely devoid of criticism of the West, stood out 
from the everyday articles and newsreels to which most Hungarians were 
States) when renowned Russian virologist Mikhail Chumakov issued a favorable statement 
about the vaccine. This report was published in the same newspaper in April 1956. Cited 
by Radio Free Europe, “Polio in Hungary. Background Report,” in RFE News & Information 
Service—Evaluation & Research Section (Budapest: Open Society Archives, 1957). 1. 
27. Dr. Frigyes Doleschall and Dr. Aladár Kátay, “Tájékoztató a Gyermekbénulásos 
Megbetegedésekről,” Népszabadság, June 27, 1957, 12.
28. Doleschall, “A Járványos Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védekezés Időszerű Feladatai” (n. 
18).
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exposed. For the sake of children’s health, instead of an imperialist spy 
or decadent oppressor, this West German became the celebrated hero 
of the day. The nameless pilot said he volunteered for the flight on his 
day off, when he heard that it was a much-needed shipment of vaccine 
for the children of Hungary. “If only everyone was like this,” commented 
the vice president of the Presidential Council in the newspaper article 
on the arrival of the vaccine.29 The government considered the vaccine so 
important, and the need to communicate their final success in securing 
it for the children so pressing, that the party newspaper could contradict 
pages of the very same issue in depicting this fruitful cooperation.
The same story unfolded in different ways on opposite sides of the 
Iron Curtain. The news of the severe polio epidemic appeared in the 
international press, as in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution there was 
a high level of interest in Hungarian affairs.30 However, while Hungarian 
sources stressed the high cost and debt that the government took on to 
import the vaccine, American newspapers talked of “aid” when it came 
to the Salk shipment.31
An explanation for the difference in the representation of those cred-
ited for the Hungarian vaccination can be found in contemporary inter-
national politics. In the years following the suppression of the revolution 
that broke out against the communist regime in October 1956, Hungar-
ian–American diplomatic relations were at a low point. According to the 
Foreign Ministry, “Among all capitalist countries,  .  .  .  relations [were] 
the worst with the United States.”32 The conflict between Hungary and 
the United States was exacerbated by the formation of a United Nations 
committee to investigate Soviet intervention and the actions of the Kádár 
government. The relationship between the two countries turned so icy that 
American ambassador Edward Wailes was recalled in the spring of 1957 
and the embassy in Budapest was left without an ambassador for the next 
ten years.33 The United States, therefore, could easily have portrayed the 
Hungarian government—which the Americans perceived to be borderline 
29. Dániel Nagy, “250 000 Köbcentiméter Salk-Vakcina Érkezett. Az Egészségügyi Minisz-
térium Tájékoztatója,” Népszabadság, July 14, 1957, 3.
30. “Polio Epidemic Feared,” Washington Post, June 5, 1957, 8; “Salk Expects End of 
Polio Some Day,” New York Times, July 9, 1957, 3; “Hungary Battle Polio,” Washington Post, 
July 2, 1957, 14.
31. “World Polio Cut by Salk Vaccine,New York Times, July 10, 1957, 19; “Budapest Receives 
Canadian Polio Aid,” New York Times, July 14, 1957, 75.
32. László Borhi, Iratok a Magyar-Amerikai Kapcsolatok Történetéhez 1957–1967, ed. Mária 
and Vida Ormos, István, Iratok a Magyar Diplomácia Történetéhez (Budapest: Ister, 2002).
33. Ibid., 20.
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illegitimate—as one needing outside help, rather than being capable of 
solving its own problems.34
At this point in the story of polio prevention, the Hungarian state was 
more flexible in its Cold War politics than was its American counterpart. 
While the revolution of 1956 deepened the Cold War divide in the eyes of 
the United States, the Hungarian government used some of the outcomes 
of the uprising to lift the Iron Curtain and temporarily allow personal 
avenues to cut through between East and West. In fact, the shipment of the 
treasured vaccine was preceded by personal packages containing single 
doses and over a year’s efforts in domestic production.
Before the decision was made to import the vaccine, the communist 
state had encouraged informal ways of ameliorating the unfolding epi-
demic. On June 27, 1957, Hungarians read the following announcement 
by the Health Minister and Dr. Aladár Kátay, head of the epidemiology 
department of the Health Ministry, in the weekly polio report of the Party’s 
daily newspaper: “We inform those who are attempting to acquire Salk-
vaccine through their family members and acquaintances living abroad 
that the Health Ministry has contacted Customs and as a result, they will 
give priority to expediting the packages that arrive from abroad and con-
tain this medicine.”35 The delicate vaccine would become useless if stalled 
at customs, therefore it was crucial to rush it through to its destination.36
The policy regarding packages arriving from the West originated from 
the tumultuous months of the 1956 revolution and its aftermath. Access 
to vital goods such as medicine was scarce, as buildings and infrastructure 
were severely damaged and production and trade were recovering slowly 
after halting completely. In addition, a good proportion of Hungary’s 
population had left the country. In late November, to facilitate aid sent 
by private persons and as a supplement to help from international orga-
nizations such as the Red Cross, the Kádár government pronounced all 
packages containing food, clothing, and medicine to be duty free until 
July 1, 1957.37
34. Hungarian archival sources reveal that the Hungarian state actually did pay for the 
vaccine. See “Határozat Gyermekbénulás Elleni Szérum Behozataláról. 37. Sz. Jkv,” manu-
script no. 3311/1957 in Minisztertanács (Budapest, July 18, 1957).
35. Doleschall and Kátay, “Tájékoztató a Gyermekbénulásos Megbetegedésekről” (n. 27).
36. Not all vaccines made it intact. A report on a small shipment that arrived as a dona-
tion from a Swiss Catholic organization revealed that the vaccine became damaged on 
the way to Hungary and could no longer be used for immunization. Kátay Aladár, “Svájci 
Polio-Vaccina Használhatósága,” manuscript no. 54074 in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Iratai 
XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: Hungarian National Archives, 1957).
37. “Terjesszék Ki a Külföldi Ajándékcsomagok Vámmentességét,” Népakarat, December 
5, 1956.
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As the polio epidemic loomed on the horizon, the package policy was 
widened, introducing an expedited customs control in order to preserve 
the effectiveness of the delicate vaccines arriving in personal packages.38 
Family members and friends had already started sending gift parcels from 
abroad in March,39 while some individuals chose to bring doses personally 
from official trips to the West in order to vaccinate their own children 
and neighbors.40
What is remarkable about this customs policy, and the encouragement 
of personal aid from family members and friends living abroad, is that 
through these announcements the state called on precisely the people it 
wanted to silence, punish, or destroy: émigrés who had left the country 
on various occasions from World War II onward because of the commu-
nist regime.41 Most recently, two hundred thousand people, out of a total 
population of nine million citizens, had left when the revolution was 
suppressed. Approximately 25 percent returned in the early summer of 
1957, after the postrevolutionary Kádár government offered amnesty to 
emigrants who were not affiliated with revolutionary actions (some were 
incarcerated and/or executed anyway). However, most emigrants never 
returned, and many spoke out ardently against the Hungarian commu-
nist regime.
Meanwhile, to prevent dependence on the West in such an important 
public health issue, the government made efforts toward domestic vaccine 
production. Plans to manufacture the Salk vaccine in Hungary started to 
emerge in June 1956, a year after it was introduced in the United States, 
even though the Health Ministry deemed the production of the vaccine 
“extremely complicated and expensive” in a report to the Ministerial 
Council.42 Before the Health Ministry would take a final stand on the 
question of polio vaccine production, a study trip abroad to explore the 
38. “Ügyészségi Intézkedés a Külföldről Érkező Salk-Szérumról,” Népakarat, July 7, 1957.
39. Medical parcels coming from abroad were not peculiar to Hungary. A Czechoslo-
vakian Radio Free Europe report from 1954 contains a detailed discussion about foreign 
medicine parcels and remarks that the health ministry of Czechoslovakia must approve of 
them reaching their destination. Radio Free Europe, “Information from Czechoslovakia. 
How the State Gets Hold of Foreign Drugs,” in Bulletin #625 (Budapest: Open Society 
Archives, 1954); Radio Free Europe, “Polio in Hungary. Background Report” (n. 26), 1.
40. Erzsébet Kertesi, personal communication, May 19, 2009.
41. In Hungarian vernacular, people who left the country illegally due to political reasons, 
e.g., during the 1956 revolution, or who did not return from a visit to the West were (and 
remain to be) termed “dissidents.” Officially, these people were considered to be traitors 
and enemies of the communist state.
42. József Román, “Gyermekbénulás Elleni Védekezés,” manuscript no. 369/1956 in 
Román József Egészségügyi Miniszter Iratai XIX-C-n (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 
1956).
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details and receive sufficient training in the process was organized. The 
destination was Denmark, the European center for polio research.43 In 
October 1956 two virologists, Elek Farkas and Sándor Koch, were sent to 
Copenhagen, accompanied by Gábor Veres, the director of the Humán 
Vaccine Production and Research Institute. The three delegates spent 
over a month in Denmark, studying vaccine production and the process 
of vaccination and presenting their own virus research.44 While they were 
away, the revolution erupted in Hungary. Although a significant number 
of medical professionals left the country during the revolution,45 the three 
scientists decided to return home in early November. As Koch remarked, 
he was a Hungarian and his place was in Hungary. Following the trip to 
Denmark, Koch had several further opportunities to test his loyalty and 
commitment to staying in Hungary. In 1961, he went traveled to Paris to 
work with Nobel Laureate André Lwoff at the Pasteur Institute for a year.46
The revolution caused a significant delay to the vaccine production 
process. It took the delegation over seven months to submit its final 
report,47 which was caught up in power struggles between the National 
Hygiene Institution and the state-owned vaccine-producing company 
Humán. The two institutions both had a strong record in vaccine research 
and had been producing vaccines since the 1920s.48 The Health Ministry 
43. In this sense, Denmark can be seen as a Western example of the porous spaces 
along both sides of the Iron Curtain and demonstrates the way that polio challenged the 
East–West binaries of the Cold War. György Péteri, in a recent collection on cultural life 
in the Cold War East, points to the similarly “osmotic” nature of the divide and proposes 
that the Iron Curtain was rather made of nylon. György Péteri, Nylon Curtain: Transnational 
and Transsystemic Tendencies in the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and East-Central Europe, 
Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societies (Trondheim: Program on East 
European Cultures and Societies, 2006).
44. Sándor Koch, Gábor Veres, and Elek Farkas, “Jelentés a Koppenhágai Tanulmányú-
tunkról,” manuscript no. 50.911 in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Állami Közegészségügyi 
Felügyeleti és Járványvédeli Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: Hungarian National 
Archives, 1957), 1.
45. The emigration wave created an obvious deficiency in the numbers of doctors, as 
shown by the fact that a year later the Health Ministry publicly called on them to return with-
out any retaliation and offered to find them work again. “Két Érdekes Előadással Kezdődött 
Meg a Balatonfüredi Orvoskongresszus,” Népakarat, September 27, 1957, 6. There is another 
explanation, though, for the open call—this type of offer was also a strategy used by the 
state to lure home and incarcerate revolutionaries.
46. Károly Mezei, “. . . Isten Van, Az Ember Történik.” Koch Sándor Virológussal Beszélget Mezei 
Károly, Miért Hiszek? (Budapest: Kairosz Kiadó, 2006).
47. Aladár Kátay, “Koppenhágai Tanulmányútról Jelentés,” manuscript no. 51406 in 
Egészségügyi Minisztérium iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: MOL, 1957).
48. Humán functioned as a department of the Phylaxia Serum Production Co. Ltd., 
established in 1912, and started producing vaccines for humans in 1924. By 1942, they were 
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planned to centralize vaccine production and merge the two institutions; 
however, for years it remained unclear which would remain in charge.49 
Production finally started in 1959 and was short-lived, as a new, live-virus 
vaccine made an appearance.50
Vaccine from the East: Sabin Drops
For the two years following the initial shipment of the Salk vaccine, it 
seemed that immunization was fully successful. The Health Ministry asked 
the Foreign Trade Minister to reward the state company that imported the 
vaccine in the summer of 1957.51 By November, over one million children 
were said to have received two doses of vaccine,52 and by the end of the 
year, the number of vaccinated children was reported to be 1.2 million.53 
Because the vaccine was seen to have contributed to curbing the epidemic 
wave, as part of the three-year health care plan and the budget alloca-
tion for the next year, the government decided to assign further funds to 
the acquisition of the Salk vaccine.54 This way, by the end of 1958, it was 
producing fourteen kinds of serums and six vaccines, including a smallpox vaccine, diph-
teria anatoxin, and antitetanus serum, some of which they exported to Austria, England, 
Switzerland, and Greece. From 1953, Humán started producing the diphteria–tetanus–per-
tussis (DTP) vaccine. In 1954, it became an independent institute. The National Institute of 
Public Health, established with funds from the Rockefeller Foundation in 1927, produced 
the BCG vaccine and vaccines against rabies, influenza, and typhus. Dr. Hegedűs Lajos, The 
History of Humán (Budapest: Human Pharmaceutical Works, 2003), 14–22.
49. Aladár Kátay, “A Humán Intézet Vírus Osztályának Átköltözése az OKI-ba,” manu-
script no. 50.189/1957 in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Állami Közegészségügyi Felügyeleti és 
Járványvédeli Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: MOL, 1957); Benyó, “A Humán Vírus-
Osztály Átvétele. Feljegyzés Dr. Vilmon Miniszterhelyettes Elvtárs Részére,” manuscript no. 
50.654 in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Állami Közegészségügyi Felügyeleti és Járványvédeli 
Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: MOL, 1957).
50. Hungarian production was still not able to handle the needs of the whole popula-
tion, as yet another import was needed to complement the domestic stock. Aladár Kátay, 
“Vaccination Against Poliomyelitis in Hungary” (paper, Eighth European Symposium on 
Poliomyelitis, Prague, September 23–26, 1962), 45.
51. “Letter to Jenő Incze Foreign Trade Minister,” in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Állami 
Közegészségügyi Felügyeleti és Járványvédeli Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: Hungar-
ian National Archives, 1957).
52. “Egymillió Gyerek Kapott Idén Védőoltást,” Népakarat, November 27, 1957.
53. Ilona Szeri, Pál Földes, and Szilárd Bognár, “Adatok a Poliomyelitis Elleni Intrakután 
Védőoltás Kérdéséhez,” Orvosi Hetilap 100, no. 38 (1959): 1364–65. 
54. “Magasabb Összeg Egészégügyre—30 Millió Salk-Vaccinára. Az Egészségügy Háro-
méves Tervéről És Jövő Évi Költségvetéséről Tárgyalt Az Országgyűlés Szociális És Egészségügyi 
Bizottsága,” Népakarat, November 15, 1957, 3.
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projected that children from birth to six years would be able to receive 
all three shots of the vaccine.55
In 1958, there was no epidemic and the government celebrated the 
achievement of immunization. However, a new and severe outbreak in 
1959 prompted the state and the medical profession to reevaluate their 
success, as hundreds of children fell prey to the disease.56 The Salk vac-
cine was quickly transformed in the public imagination from being the 
savior of Hungarian children to an imperfect technology. This process was 
exacerbated by the appearance of the Sabin vaccine in the Soviet Union. 
By August 1959, newspapers were starting to write about the arrival of this 
new vaccine, one that would be even more effective than the Salk vaccine: 
“a vaccine that was developed based on research by the American Sabin.”57
The new vaccine was the result of a unique cooperation between the 
American and Russian scientists Mikhail Chumakov and Albert Sabin, 
during a particular moment of the Cold War. The slight thaw that fol-
lowed Stalin’s death opened up new opportunities for exchange, and 
Khrushchev’s secret speech against Stalin’s rule had significant effects on 
biomedical sciences as well.58 For the first time since World War II, medi-
cal cooperation between the two superpowers started to become a reality.
The strict control over scientists’ foreign travel was not just a feature of 
the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Many American scientists in the 1950s 
ran into difficulties or were denied, for political reasons, when applying 
for passports in the United States (up to 1958, a total of six hundred 
passport applications were denied on political grounds).59 Sabin’s rela-
tive freedom in traveling, therefore, was not entirely typical of his time.
55. I. Benyó, “Gyermekbénulás Elleni Folytatólagos Védőoltások Szervezése,” manu-
script no. 53.135/1957 in Egészségügyi Minisztérium Állami Közegészségügyi Felügyeleti 
és Járványvédeli Főosztály Iratai XIX-C-2-e (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1957).
56. While the cases were fewer in number than during the severe epidemic of 1957, they 
climbed higher than any other year before. The epidemic escalated in August, and nearly two 
thousand patients were paralyzed from polio by the end of the epidemic wave. “Az Egészsé-
gügyi Minisztérium Tájékoztatója Az Ország 1959. Évi Július Havi Járványügyi Helyzetéről,” 
Népegészségügy 40, no. 9 (1959): 252; “Az Egészségügyi Minisztérium Tájékoztatója Az Ország 
1959. Évi Augusztus Havi Járványügyi Helyzetéről,” Népegészségügy 40, no. 10 (1959): 279–80. 
57. Dr. Tibor Bakács, “A Fertőző Betegségek Elleni Küzdelem,” Népszabadság, August 
26, 1959, 4.
58. Konstantin Ivanov, “Science after Stalin: Forging a New Image of Soviet Science,” 
Sci. Context 15, no. 2 (2002): 317–38.
59. Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism and the 
Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 276–77.
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The scientific exchange between Sabin and Chumakov led to the larg-
est field trial in the history of polio,60 involving over 16.5 million people 
across the Soviet Union.61 Parallel to the Soviet campaign, smaller but 
equally important trials were conducted in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.62 
In 1958–59, Czechoslovakia organized relatively large field trials of a vac-
cine prepared from the Sabin strains,63 while Hungary tested the vaccine 
in one county in November 1959.64
The success of the new vaccines ignited a scientific euphoria, strength-
ening the sense that science, as putatively objective and universal, could 
serve as a tool to stop the Cold War and unite humanity in a common 
struggle. Opening the Sixth Symposium of the European Association 
of Poliomyelitis in 1959 in Munich, the president of the organization 
referred to the participating scientists—from twenty-five different coun-
tries—as “members of our polio family.”65 Going a step further, at the Fifth 
International Poliomyelitis Conference in 1960 in Copenhagen, Basil 
O’Connor (who was president of the American National Foundation for 
Infantile Paralysis) celebrated the achievements of the cooperation in 
his opening speech:
This is a council, not of war, but of victory. Together we have successfully cre-
ated weapons against a common enemy that bring within our reach a triumph 
for all mankind—the coming elimination of epidemic paralytic poliomyelitis. 
We meet now to compare notes on what we have created, to report our expe-
riences and help each other in reaching decisions on the most effective use 
of those weapons. Your very presence here, from the East, from the West, is 
proof to the world that in your high calling, in search for the truth that frees 
man from disease, there is no cold war.66
60. While Soviet vaccination campaigns were not strictly controlled trials, they were 
designed to gain information about the efficacy and safety of the vaccine. Contemporary 
sources discussed the enterprise alternatively as a “trial,” “extensive campaign,” or “mass 
vaccination.” See, e.g., “Oral Poliomyelitis Vaccine,” Brit. Med. J. 2, no. 5247 (1961): 293–94.
61. M. P. Chumakov et al., “Some Results of the Work on Mass Immunization in the 
Soviet Union with Live Poliovirus Vaccine Prepared from Sabin Strains,” Bull. World Health 
Organization 25, no. 1 (1961): 79–91.
62. The Sabin strains had also been tested previously in Singapore (1958) and in Mexico 
(1959): “Singapore Trial of Live Poliomyelitis Vaccine,” Brit. Med. J. 1, no. 5138 (1959): 
1618–19; “Poliomyelitis Prevention,” WHO Chron. 14 (1960): 464.
63. Karel Žáček et al., “Mass Oral (Sabin) Poliomyelitis Vaccination: Virological and 
Serological Surveillance in Czechoslovakia, 1958–59 and 1960,” Brit. Med. J. 1, no. 5285 
(1962): 1091–98.
64. I. Dömök, Elisabeth Molnár, and Ágnes Jancsó, “Virus Excretion after Mass Vaccina-
tion with Attenuated Polioviruses in Hungary,” Brit. Med. J. 1, no. 5237 (1961): 1410–17.
65. H. C. A. Lassen, “Eröffnungsansprache” (paper, Sixth Symposium of the European 
Association of Poliomyelitis, Brussels, 1959), 6.
66. Basil O’Connor, “The Setting for Scientific Research in the Last Half of the Twen-
tieth Century,” in Fifth International Poliomyelitis Conference, ed. International Poliomyelitis 
Congress (Copenhagen, Denmark, 1960), xxi–xxii, quotation on xxi.
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This feeling of unity marked the end of a decade in which other domains 
of science were hindered by Cold War tensions. During the 1950s, the 
Soviet Union, along with Eastern European countries, had left the WHO 
in protest against the international agency’s politics. Until the early 1960s, 
biomedical research on inheritance was divided between the opposing 
theories of Soviet Michurinist biology and Western Mendelist genetics.67 
At the end of the 1950s, however, several projects of internationalism 
eliciting the neutrality of science and medicine started to unfold, often 
containing open or underlying Cold War agendas.68
Although the development of the live vaccine was the result of intensive 
cooperation across the Iron Curtain, its implementation followed Cold 
War fault lines. Several major points of conflict emerged, all of which 
had significant effects on polio prevention in Hungary and worldwide. 
Convictions and reservations about the efficacy and safety of the Sabin 
vaccine divided East and West, while varying health care and economic 
structures had a direct effect on the choice of vaccine (i.e., whether to 
stick with the Salk vaccine or change to Sabin), as well as on the speed of 
introduction and licensing. Furthermore, differences in welfare systems 
and socialized medicine, sensitive Cold War concerns, influenced the 
efficiency of vaccine application.
Little more than two weeks after the Hungarian field trials started, the 
government announced a nationwide vaccination campaign starting in 
mid-December 1959.69 This quick acceptance of the brand-new vaccine in 
Hungary was a marked contrast to the skepticism voiced about the Salk 
vaccine back in the mid-1950s. In April 1955 in the United States, a num-
ber of vaccinated patients, their families, and community contacts were 
diagnosed with poliomyelitis from a vaccine produced by Cutter Labora-
tories.70 This incident had a tremendous impact: it shook public trust in 
67. See Nikolai Krementsov, Stalinist Science (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 179–83, and Loren R. Graham, What Have We Learned about Science and Technology from 
the Russian Experience? (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 34–35.
68. Marking international, neutral spaces that were reserved for scientific research, the 
Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959, followed by the Outer Space Treaty in 1967. Jon Agar, 
Science in the Twentieth Century and Beyond, History of Science (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), 
347–48. The World Health Organization launched its highly politicized global malaria 
eradication program in 1955, and plans for the global eradication of smallpox emerged in 
1958. See Randall Packard, “‘No Other Logical Choice’: Global Malaria Eradication and 
the Politics of International Health in the Post-War Era,” Parassitologia 40, nos. 1–2 (1998): 
217–29; and Erez Manela, “A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War 
History,” Diplomatic Hist. 34, no. 2 (2010): 299–323.
69. “December 14-én Kezdődnek a Gyermekbénulás Elleni Sabin-Féle Védőoltások,” 
Népszava, November 22, 1959, 1.
70. Neal Nathanson and Alexander D. Langmuir, “The Cutter Incident: Poliomyelitis 
Following Formaldehyde-Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccination in the United States during the 
Spring of 1955,” Amer. J. Epidemiol. 78, no. 1 (1964): 109–40.
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the vaccine and changed vaccine regulation and control in the United 
States.71 In connection with the Cutter incident, a Hungarian newspaper 
article in 1955 (based on an article in the French newspaper l’Humanité) 
argued, “The effectiveness of a new vaccine can be established only after 
a long time and numerous experiments. It is a dramatic fact that due to 
such negligence many thousands of children became the guinea pigs of 
the savage protectors of free enterprise.”72 Four years, two epidemics, and 
a revolution later, the Hungarian press was not so squeamish about time 
and number of experiments. There was a greater need for vaccination 
that actually worked.
Concern over the safety of the Salk vaccine was soon ameliorated by the 
growing number of success stories in curbing the escalating tendencies 
of polio epidemics in Europe and the United States thanks to immuniza-
tion. While knowledge about the rate of efficacy and recommended dos-
age remained in flux, by 1957 the Hungarian government could rely on a 
wide-ranging international experience of two years, reported in the pages 
of medical journals and at international polio conferences, for the deci-
sion-making process of importing the vaccine and immunizing the nation.
In the case of the Sabin vaccine, the context could not have been more 
different. There was no comparable international experience or clear 
success stories that could reassure Hungarian scientists and the political 
leadership. Not one country had begun national mass vaccination by the 
fall of 1959, and due to the novelty of the vaccine, there were no long-term 
observations determining the percentage of the population who would 
be protected against the three polio strains. Merely two large-scale trials, 
albeit involving millions of vaccines, provided evidence of the efficacy and 
safety of the new product.
However, this time the trials were all conducted on home ground, 
so to speak—on the “right” side of the Iron Curtain. Intensive scientific 
cooperation among Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, 
fostered greatly during the years of inactive membership of the WHO 
between 1949 and 1957,73 made it possible for Hungarian scientists to 
monitor live polio vaccine trials in the Eastern Bloc from the very begin-
71. Oshinsky, Polio (n. 5); Paul A. Offit, The Cutter Incident: How America’s First Polio Vac-
cine Led to the Growing Vaccine Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005); and James 
Colgrove, State of Immunity: The Politics of Vaccination in Twentieth-Century America (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006).
72. Quoted in “Background Report on Polio in Hungary,” Radio Free Europe Informa-
tion Service (Budapest: Open Society Archives, 1957).
73. The Soviet Union, followed by Eastern European countries, withdrew its membership 
between 1949 and 1957. Since, according to the founding document of the WHO, it is not 
possible to leave the organization once a country joins, these countries became “inactive 
members.” During these years, Eastern European countries signed bilateral agreements
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ning and to gain direct information about the results by participating in 
personal visits.74
While proximity and the role of the East in the vaccine trials played a 
large part in the quick adaptation of the Sabin vaccine, these cannot serve 
as the sole explanations. As the story of the Salk vaccine’s introduction 
shows, Hungarian scientists were able to take on-site visits to manufactur-
ing labs in the West and were participants in the increasingly intensive 
circulation of scientific knowledge about polio. In this sense, Western 
scientific contacts, established before and after the communist takeover, 
furthered the establishment of trust in Western technology.75 Moreover, 
by the late fall of 1959, Salk vaccine production in Hungary had already 
started in preparation for the following year.
As the memoir of Hungarian pediatrician Domokos Boda shows, the 
Cold War divide could have surprising effects: trust in Western and distrust 
in Eastern technology. Boda was part of the delegation sent to Moscow 
to investigate the new vaccine in order to inform the Hungarian govern-
ment’s choice between the Salk and Sabin vaccines. He recounted meeting 
a group of Soviet virologists on his arrival; they were ardently against the 
introduction of the new vaccine in the Soviet Union. They argued that 
the Salk vaccine could be considered safe, since the Americans tested it 
on their own people. The Sabin vaccine was a solution that the Americans 
did not wish to test on their own society; therefore, it must be considered 
as potentially dangerous. As Boda remembered, some even went so far as 
to consider the introduction of the Sabin vaccine to be part of a scheme 
by the Americans to destroy millions of Soviet children, cutting future 
to advance scientific cooperation in health-related issues and epidemic control. See, for 
instance, “A Magyar Népköztársaság Kormánya És a Csehszlovák Köztársaság Kormánya 
Között Az Egészségügyi Együttműködésre Vonatkozóan Létrejött és Budapesten 1955. Ápri-
lis 28. Napján Aláírt Egyezmény,” in A Minisztertanács üléseinek jegyzőkönyvei XIX-A-83-a 
(Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1957); The First Ten Years of the World Health Organiza-
tion (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1958).
74. The efficiency and safety of live virus vaccines were highly debated in the pages of 
medical journals all over the world, as were doubts over the efficiency of the Salk vaccine. 
Fears of an attenuated virus turning virulent, questions of how vaccine efficiency was mea-
surable in the case of a disease that ebbs and tides, and issues pertaining to the method of 
comparison between dead and live virus vaccines sparked discussions among virologists and 
public health specialists before, during, and after vaccine tests.
75. The Hungarian trust in the Salk vaccine in this aspect is similar to what Michael Z. 
David explores in his work on the introduction of the BCG vaccine into the Soviet Union. 
The Western connections with individual scientists were important to the establishment of 
trust in the controversial vaccine, which was adopted in the Soviet Union without much 
professional resistance. David, “Vaccination Against Tuberculosis with BCG:A Study of 
Innovation in Soviet Public Health,” in Soviet Medicine: Culture, Practice, Science, ed. Frances 
L. Bernstein, Christopher Burton, and Dan Healey (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 2010), 132–55.
Polio Vaccination across the Iron Curtain 337
generations short and thereby weakening the nation.76 With these senti-
ments, the Soviet scientists were expressing more general frustrations that 
often arise with the appearance of new vaccines: the potential to cause 
disease and harm.77
If some Soviet scientists themselves trusted the Western vaccine more 
than their own, how was Hungary to proceed? “My colleagues and I were 
in a difficult situation,” Boda wrote. “It would be impossible to use the 
Sabin vaccine in Hungary if the official Soviet view was known. After 
agonising, we recommended the Sabin vaccine and kept quiet about the 
controversy.”78 The fact that the Sabin vaccine arrived from the East, there-
fore, cannot alone explain the speedy implementation and fast decision 
making of the Hungarian government. A more plausible explanation is 
that the communist government could not afford another demonstration 
of the limits of its power by a new epidemic that would be decidedly out of 
their control. After the severe epidemic of 1959, it became clear that Salk 
vaccination did not fulfill the hopes of curbing polio in Hungary: despite 
a widespread campaign, the disease rampaged through the country. The 
government needed to act fast. To this end, the rapid introduction of a 
new vaccine that promised to eradicate polio seemed the only choice.
Cold War Fault Lines
Mass vaccination with the live polio vaccine quickly spread in Eastern 
Europe, as Czechoslovakia extended its existing vaccination program to 
the national level and Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany followed 
suit in 1960. Other European countries started using the live vaccine in the 
years 1962 and 1963.79 The rate was slower in the case of the United States. 
While it took U.S. authorities an incredibly brief two hours to license the 
Salk vaccine in 1955,80 it took almost three years for the American Public 
Health Service to do the same for the live vaccine.81
76. Domokos Boda, Sorsfordulók (Budapest: Harmat, 2004), 63–64.
77. The mass, experimental use of the Sabin vaccine did not go uncontested in the Soviet 
Union. Inner power struggles marked the preparation of the trial, as Chumakov’s letters 
to Sabin attest. Quoted in Benison, “International Medical Cooperation” (n. 4), 474–75.
78. Domokos Boda, “50 Years Ago: Polio Epidemics, Immunisation, and Politics,” Brit. 
Med. J. 340 (2010): b5297 
79. S. G. Drozdov, “The Contemporary Poliomyelitis Situation in Europe” (paper, Euro-
pean Symposium on Virus Diseases Control, 1966, Geneva.
80. Oshinsky, Polio (n. 5), 207.
81. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was responsible for licensing, acting 
on the recommendation of the Surgeon General. The latter was advised by the National 
Institutes of Health and the Division of Biologics Standards. Subcommittee on Health and 
Safety of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Polio Vaccines. First Session on 
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While the introduction of a new vaccine depended on various factors, 
such as health care structures, countries’ individual experiences with 
vaccination, and concerns over efficacy and especially safety,82 Cold War 
considerations played a large part in the Western evaluation of the vac-
cine. Just as some Soviet virologists did not trust the Western Salk vaccine, 
Americans had similar reservations about the vaccine from the Soviet 
side. The most pressing questions about this Cold War scientific feat were 
these: Could the Russians be trusted? Would their data be false? Did the 
new vaccine actually work?
To resolve the issue of scientific trustworthiness and to bridge Cold War 
suspicions, the WHO, already highly interested in global disease eradica-
tion, sent an American specialist from Yale, Dorothy M. Horstmann, to the 
Soviet Union to report on the safety of the vaccine and the validity of the 
trials.83 The idea for the visit actually came from the United States: John 
R. Paul, renowned virologist and polio expert at Yale University, suggested 
his colleague to the Division of Communicable Diseases at WHO and to 
Mikhail Chumakov.84 Since 1954, the health agency had established a role 
for itself in coordinating poliomyelitis research and aiding the circulation 
of information about statistics, epidemiology, field trials, and laboratory 
investigation;85 it was happy to fulfill the American request for the valida-
tion trip.86 Its task of scientific evaluation, despite being a facilitator of 
Cold War tensions, fit into this self-proclaimed role of bridging local and 
global in public health issues.87
Developments with Respect to the Manufacture of Live Virus Polio Vaccine and Results of Utilization 
of Killed Virus Polio Vaccine, March 16 1961 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1961), 3–4.
82. Elaborate debates on vaccine efficacy and safety unfolded in the pages of medi-
cal journals, particularly the British Medical Journal, and at professional meetings such as 
the International Poliomyelitis Conferences from the beginning of the Salk field trials in 
1955. Fears over whether the Sabin strains could turn virulent raised caution among public 
health decision makers in several countries. See Lindner and Blume, “Vaccine Innovation 
and Adoption,” (n. 12).
83. Dorothy Horstmann, “Report on Live Poliovirus Vaccination in the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, Poland and Czechoslovakia” (Geneva: World Health Organization, 1959).
84. A. M.-M. Payne, “Letter to John R. Paul,” 1959, Dorothy Millicent Horstmann Papers, 
Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven; John R. Paul, “Letter to A. M.-M. 
Payne,” 1959, Horstmann Papers; John R. Paul, “Letter to Mikhail Chumakov,” 1959, Horst-
mann Papers.
85. Executive Board, “The Co-ordinating Role of WHO in Poliomyelitis Research” 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 1954).
86. Payne, “Letter to John R. Paul” (n. 84).
87. This was not the first instance of an international health agency taking on the task 
of validating vaccine trials. Clifford Rosenberg has recently argued that the League of 
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Between August 26 and October 17, 1959, Horstmann visited Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and several Soviet republics to gather information on-site 
about the vaccine trials. The WHO delegate voiced overall satisfaction 
in her report on the Soviet Union. She saw no reason to doubt the level 
of surveillance of polio cases during the trial and judged the Sabin vac-
cine to be safe. However, Horstmann did admit that it was difficult to say 
how effective the vaccine was since many of the subjects had previously 
received the Salk vaccine and too little time had elapsed since the trial to 
draw definite conclusions.
If skepticism about the Russian results was rooted in Cold War distrust 
of the East, Horstmann’s report used a very similar set of tools to dissolve 
doubts and validate those same results. She drew upon two powerful 
notions that were connected to communist countries: the centralized, 
totalitarian state and its submissive citizens.
Horstmann highlighted the role of a centralized and state-operated 
public health system in successfully organizing such a trial: a critical dif-
ference between East and West that was frequently mobilized in Cold War 
rhetoric on both sides. “The scope and magnitude of the live poliovirus 
vaccine programmes . . . are of a type peculiarly fitted to the manner in 
which the medical profession is organized under the Ministries of Health 
in these countries. For such mass programmes it is necessary to have a 
Medical Service organized almost on a military basis, particularly from the 
epidemiologic surveillance and Public Health stand point.”88 In the Soviet 
case, a state and health care system that was centrally controlled from top 
to bottom could be capable of organizing a project on a mass scale and 
at the same time vouch for the rigor and scrutiny that was expected from 
such a scientific trial. This, implied Horstmann’s report, was the upside 
of a totalitarian communist regime.
With this argument, Horstmann addressed persistent questions about 
effective disease management that challenged concepts of Western supe-
riority in medical research and care. In 1948, at the First International 
Poliomyelitis Conference in New York, Herbert J. Seddon of Oxford Uni-
versity pointed out that “at the present time there is more than enough 
dictatorship in the world and we do not want to add to it. Yet there is 
no doubt that the cheapest and best way of dealing with poliomyelitis 
is to have organizations in readiness headed by men of acknowledged 
Nations Health Organization issued guidelines on clinical research for vaccine developers 
that eventually led to the largest vaccine trial of its time: Calmette’s trial of the BCG vaccine 
in Algiers. Rosenberg, “The International Politics of Vaccine Testing in Interwar Algiers,” 
Amer. Hist. Rev. 117, no. 3 (2012): 671–97.
88. Horstmann, “Report on Live Poliovirus Vaccination” (n. 83), 99.
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competence, who, for a limited time, are permitted a very large measure 
of authority.”89 The merit of certain autocratic measures in successfully 
preventing or treating disease, and the frustrations that this perception 
caused in Cold War thinking, became a recurring issue in the history of 
polio, most prominently in the trials and evaluations of the Sabin vaccine.
Indeed, the Sabin vaccine was (and still is) at its most potent when 
applied en masse over a short period of time. Dictatorships and central-
ized governments—at least theoretically—would be able to mobilize their 
resources and population quickly and efficiently for such an endeavor. 
Moreover, free, mass vaccination was a cherished symbol of universal 
health care in which Eastern European countries took pride, but in some 
parts of the Western world it was perceived as the devil itself. As David 
Oshinsky points out, health officials in the United States connected this 
system of prevention with socialized medicine, “one of the great bugaboos 
of the cold-war era.”90 In this reading, health care ideology could be seen 
as another reason for the U.S. reluctance to use the Sabin vaccine widely 
when it first appeared.
Leading Hungarian virologist Tibor Bakács remembers being puzzled 
as to why the United States had not switched to the Sabin vaccine when 
socialist countries had already done so in 1959. He posed this question 
to Sabin himself, when the professor was visiting the State Institute of 
Hygiene in 1960. According to Bakács’s memoir,
He gave a short, but thought-provoking answer: “Sir! In the West vaccine 
production is mainly in private hands. These have, since 1954, since Salk has 
discovered his vaccine, been producing that with great capacity. They hoped to 
gain a huge profit from the production and distribution of this first, partially 
effective vaccine. Although my vaccine is more efficient, they do not produce 
it until there are significant Salk-vaccine supplies waiting to be sold. Until these 
are depleted, they will not start the mass production of the Sabin-drops.” Only 
socialist countries chose to abandon their existing Salk-vaccine supplies. This 
is the reason why there were still big epidemics in the rich, Western countries 
in the 1960s.91
While Sabin’s reply was most probably influenced by a decade-long con-
flict with Jonas Salk and the American funding bodies, and Bakács might 
have interpreted Sabin’s words in a way that conformed to his own senti-
ments, the success of the Sabin vaccination in Hungary became a recur-
89. Herbert J. Seddon, “Economic Aspects of the Management of Poliomyelitis,” in First 
International Poliomyelitis Conference (New York: Lippincott, 1948), 35.
90. Oshinsky, Polio (n. 5), 241.
91. Tibor Bakács, Egy Életrajz Ürügyén (Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1978), 202.
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ring example when emphasizing the superiority of socialist over capital-
ist countries. Seven years after the vaccination program started, Vilmos 
Kapos, director of the Budapest Public Health and Epidemiology Station, 
still felt it necessary to remark on the international significance of the 
Sabin vaccine in an internal party meeting in 1966: “The social implica-
tions of the fight against epidemic diseases are demonstrated with the fact 
that while in Socialist countries the occurrence of polio could be reduced 
to the minimum with the use of the free and effective Sabin vaccine, the 
results of capitalist countries, due to economic problems, do not come 
even close to this.”92 The Hungarian success in polio vaccination was thus 
celebrated as a triumph of the entire system of political ideology, welfare, 
and economic structure. It became the ultimate proof of the superiority 
of communist values and their system.
By 1969, polio had been practically eradicated in Hungary,93 ten years 
before the United States achieved the same result. The end of polio in 
Hungary meant the end of intensive scientific cooperation and interac-
tion between the two antagonistic worlds. The success of one vaccine 
over another became a symbol of superiority in health care systems and 
economic status. Long gone was the figure of the West German pilot, 
the packages of vaccines crossing borders, and the iron lungs flying over 
the Iron Curtain. As the age of polio ended for many of the countries 
involved in the Cold War, so did cooperation against the common micro-
scopic enemy. The holes in the Iron Curtain were patched up and the 
division between East and West again became prominent once the polio 
problem was “solved.”
92. Vilmos Kapos, “Jelentés a Főváros Közegészségügyi Járványügyi Helyzetéről,” in 
MSZMP Budapesti pártértekezletei 1957–1989 XXXV.1.a.2 (Budapest: Budapest City Archives, 
1966), 436. 
93. The last wild polio outbreak in Hungary occurred in 1966 in an isolated Roma com-
munity, and the last polio case was registered in 1969. The last polio case in the United 
States was recorded in 1979. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (led by the WHO, Rotary 
International, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and UNICEF) was 
launched in 1988 and is the authority that issues polio-free certification. Polio eradication 
in a country or region is defined as the absence of wild poliomyelitis transmission for three 
consecutive years. The Americas were certified as free of polio in 1994, the Western Pacific 
in 2000, and Europe in 2002. “Global Polio Eradication Initiative” (World Health Organi-
zation), http://www.polioeradication.org/Posteradication/Certification.aspx; I. Dömök, 
“Experiences Associated with the Use of Live Poliovirus Vaccine in Hungary, 1959–1982,” 
Rev. Infect. Dis. 6, suppl. 2 (1984): S413–18; and Beatrix Kapusinszky, “Molecular Genetic 
Examination of Paralytic Type 3 Poliovirus Isolates and Molecular Epidemiology of Non-
Polio Enteroviruses in Hungary” (Ph.D. diss., Eötvös Loránd University of Science, 2010), 1.
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The spaces of scientific cooperation on a wider level also narrowed, 
as polio disappeared from the global North. The National Foundation 
for Infantile Paralysis looked for a new grand project to utilize its pub-
lic relations machinery and scientific networks.94 The last international 
poliomyelitis conference was held in 1960, while the last Symposium of 
the European Association for Poliomyelitis took place in 1962.95
However, the window of cooperation that polio opened between East 
and West had long-term effects and continued to influence disease preven-
tion strategies long after that cooperation ceased to exist. The Hungarian 
model of “blanket” vaccination—that is, mass vaccination of the whole 
population in the course of a short time—eventually became the basis for 
global polio eradication.96 Drawing on the success of smallpox eradication 
after 1980, plans for the eradication of polio that had started to form in 
the late 1950s reemerged. The World Health Assembly passed a resolu-
tion in 1988 on the eradication of the disease from the planet and set the 
year 2000 as the target. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative, backed by 
significant private funds, has been based on mass immunization with oral 
live poliovirus vaccines. Thus, polio again formed a basis for coordination 
in the final years of the Cold War, building on vaccines developed as part 
of the cooperation between East and West in its early years.
In many ways, then, the story of polio did not finish with the end of 
its outbreaks, neither in Hungary nor at the international level. The dis-
ease continued to challenge the social and political makeup of Hungary 
decades after the last polio cases occurred in the country. Furthermore, 
polio shows that holes in the Iron Curtain continued to open and close 
throughout the dynamic relationship between East and West during the 
Cold War.
94. As a major postpolio project, Jonas Salk, along with Basil O’Connor and other 
prestigious scientists, established the Salk Institute, with a declared goal of bridging the sci-
ences and humanities for “the advancement and unification of knowledge relevant to the 
health and well-being of man.” The Cold War politics of the endeavor are explored in Elena 
Aronova, “Studies of Science Before ‘Science Studies’: Cold War and the Politics of Science 
in the U.S., U.K., and the U.S.S.R., 1950s–1970s” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San 
Diego, 2012), quotation on 127. 
95. María Isabel Porras, María José Báguena, and Rosa Ballester, “Spain and the Inter-
national Scientific Conferences on Polio,” Dynamis 30 (2010): 91–118.
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